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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions*
How can individuals be held accountable for the acts of groups when the precise identity
of the perpetrator of a crime is unknown? This is a fundamental question for modern
international law, which imposes individual, rather than collective, criminal responsibility for
actions against humanity.1 One answer is found in the doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise
(JCE) that was initially defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ITCY), and has been applied by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the
Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL). JCE is a way of committing a crime, similar to the way in
which one may plan, instigate, order or aid and abet; it is not a crime in and of itself. It has been
an invaluable tool for prosecutors trying to pin the blame on individuals where evidence of a
group action, but not of any one particular perpetrator, is available.2 Additionally, the popularity
of JCE is also due to the fact that superior responsibility generally requires a higher evidentiary
showing than JCE.3
There are three types of JCE, and each one must satisfy three requirements: the crime
must involve a plurality of persons; there must be a common plan, design or purpose that
involves the commission of a crime; and the Accused must participate in that plan.4

*ISSUE: What is the current status of the legality of the criminal liability theory of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) in
light of the most recent international criminal law jurisprudence from the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL? Can it be argued
that JCE theory was part of customary international law in 1975?
1
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Judgment of 15 July 1999, [reproduced at Tab 13][Hereinafter “Tadic Appeal”]
Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, IT-02-60-T, Judgment of 17 January 2005, [reproduced at Tab 7] [hereinafter
“Blagojevic Trial”], cited in Jacob A. Ramer, Hate by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for
Persecution, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L COMP. L. 31 (2007)[reproduced at Tab 32][hereinafter “Ramer”] at 32.
2
A parallel may be drawn with the notion of “joint and several” liability in Tort law, and where several actors create
a situation where harm occurs, though it is unclear which one is responsible for the harm. Though the types of law in
which the situation arises are drastically different from one another, this type of liability may be a helpful way of
conceptualizing the Doctrine.
3
Elies van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide, J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 184, (Mar. 2007), [reproduced at Tab 40] [hereinafter “van Sliedregt”]at 187.
4
Tadic Appeal, supra at FN 1, at Para. 228, cited by van Sliedregt at 186.

1

The first form of JCE, JCE I, involves the situation in which all the co participants share
the same criminal intent, e.g., where all the co-perpetrators formulate a plan to kill a particular
individual. Though only one person may commit the actual act of killing, the rest are liable based
on their shared intent towards the killing. The mens rea for JCE I requires the actor to have
voluntarily participated in one aspect of the common design and to have intended the result of
the crime.5
The second form of JCE, JCE II, arises when a Defendant is an active participant in the
“enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred from the position of authority and
the specific functions held by each accused.”6 This type of JCE liability is commonly referred to
as the concentration camp type of JCE liability. Here, the mens rea comprises “(i) knowledge of
the nature of the system and (ii) the intent to further the common concerted design to ill-treat
inmates.”7
The third, and by far the most contentious of the forms of JCE liability, arises in
situations like mob violence, where there exists a common plan to commit a criminal act, and
during the commission of this original act, a further criminal act, which was foreseeable, is
committed. Under this extended form of JCE liability, the Defendant is responsible for crimes
that go beyond the common plan if they were aware that those non-agreed upon crimes were a
foreseeable result of the JCE; and they nonetheless participated and “willingly” accepted the risk.
The first element of mens rea under JCE III is objective, the second is subjective.
The questions of whether JCE was customary international law in 1975, and what the
limits of JCE liability are today, are of critical importance to the Extraordinary Chambers of the

5

Tadic Appeal, supra at FN 1, at Para. 204, cited by Ramer, supra at FN 1, at 55.
Ramer at 55.
7
Tadic Appeal, supra at FN 1, at Para. 204, cited by Ramer at 55.
6

2

Court of Cambodia (ECCC). Many of the perpetrators of the crimes committed during the period
of Democratic Kampuchea did not physically perpetrate those heinous acts. Additionally, many
of the atrocities of the regime were carried out by groups of individuals whose individual guilt
for a crime in which they participated would be extremely difficult to discern. This problem is
compounded by the fact that many of these crimes were committed over 30 years ago. Obtaining
evidence to establish criminal liability in crimes committed by groups is extremely difficult
under the best conditions; the lapse in time might render establishing guilt nothing short of
impossible. JCE provides a way of ensuring that those criminals who are responsible for the
atrocities of the period are held to account for their actions.
Summary of Conclusions
(1) The jurisprudence of the ICTY indicates that the Tribunal is starting to restrict the use
of the JCE Doctrine, which had become quite widespread. In particular, the ICTY has
required increasingly more rigorous displays of culpable mental state in order to find
a Defendant guilty under JCE liability, and has required the Prosecutor to define the
JCE alleged with more specificity.
(2) The jurisprudence of the ICTR, while also working to define the proper limits of JCE
liability, has not engaged in the same limiting process of the ICTY. In fact, in some
areas, it appears that the Doctrine is actually being expanded rather than contracted.
(3) The jurisprudence of the SCSL is still too sparse to analyze what sort of application
the Doctrine will receive. It does appear, however, that the Doctrine is being applied
and will continue to be so into the foreseeable future.
(4) The Doctrine of JCE liability existed in customary international law in 1975, at the
time that Democratic Kampuchea was committing its various human rights abuses.

3

Because JCE liability was found to be customary international law in the early 1990’s
at the time of the widespread human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia, and
because no significant customary international legal precedents occurred in the 15
odd years between the atrocities in Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, the Tadic
analysis suffices to support this argument.

4

II. Factual Background
Prior to the Nuremburg Trials, individuals committing crimes during wartime were tried
by national courts under national laws, usually in the context of military courts, if they were tried
at all. Making individuals accountable for crimes found within international instruments required
a broad analytical leap, especially since only States had legal personality in international law,
and the treaties themselves made no mention of individual criminal responsibility.8 This
exclusive focus on State responsibility had its roots as far back as the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648. The effort to institute this dramatic change has even been called “judicial activism” by
many commentators. The “dramatic analytical leap” had some support in the fact that the Treaty
of Versailles after World War I had allowed for the Allies to try German military leaders before
their military courts.9 However, before the Nuremburg trial, there had been no customary
international law allowing for trials of civilians during wartime. Moreover, the atrocities carried
out by the Nazis often involved large groups of individuals, acting in concert, so that the
contribution of any one person may not have seemed significant, but when combined, led to
unspeakable acts.
Many of the prosecutors and judges at that time turned to “common design liability”
which had its roots in English criminal law, as a means to prosecute crimes committed by groups
of individuals acting in concert. 10 Both the common and civil law systems had mechanisms that
attempted to deal with these issues. In the mind of at least one expert, the combination of
traditions applied by judges in different countries and different trials has lead to a great deal of
the ambiguity existent in JCE liability today.11 This would certainly make a great deal of sense as

8

Ramer, supra at FN 1 at 34.
Id.
10
van Sliedregt, supra at FN 3 at 185.
11
Id. at 190.
9

5

the origins of the Tadic decision, where the Doctrine was first defined, relied upon cases which
spanned both legal traditions in a haphazard manner, devoid of codification or systematic
treatment.12
Still, that no one today thinks it odd that civilians, as well as military personnel, may now
be tried for a whole host of crimes as determined by customary international law speaks to the
enduring nature of the legal precedents established at Nuremburg.13 And it is precisely within the
many precedents of the Nuremburg Trials, and the subsequent trials carried on afterwards that
applied Nuremburg principals, that the arguments for JCE are found.
Cassese has noted that the doctrine of JCE has become a “consolidated” concept in
international law, owing to its application in the various international and hybrid tribunals that
have emerged since the establishment of the ICTY.14 While the present status of JCE may be
established, though still subject to criticisms regarding the extended liability of JCE III, the
question about whether it existed in customary international law in the early 1990’s when gross
human rights violations were occurring in the former Yugoslavia, required an extensive analysis
of those Nuremburg-era precedents. That analysis occurred in the Tadic Appeal.
Since being defined and applied by the ICTY, the doctrine of JCE liability has had both
critics and supporters. One prominent cause for criticism is the view that the various tribunals do
not apply the JCE Doctrine uniformly, either amongst themselves, or even within the various
chambers of an individual tribunal itself. The confusion has been attributed to the “hybrid
civil/common law” origins of the JCE Doctrine; some believe that JCE is based upon co12

Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 69 (March 2007). [reproduced at Tab XX] [hereinafter Ohlin] at 70.
13
Ramer at 34.
14
Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise,
5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109 (2007)[reproduced at Tab 33][hereinafter “Cassese”], at 110. Mr. Cassese was the first
President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.

6

perpetration, a civil law concept “used to distinguish those who are closely involved in
committing a crime from those merely assisting the commission of a crime”, and others believe it
to be an outgrowth of common law accomplice liability.15 Moreover, a common criticism of the
doctrine is that the extended liability arising under JCE III leads to what is, effectively, a
negligence standard of mens rea which is totally inappropriate for criminal law, especially when
the charges involved are serious. This is because, as Schabas explains, requiring that the acts
committed by a co-perpetrator be natural and foreseeable implies a reasonable person standard
towards those additional crimes.16 This has caused great concern amongst many legal academics
as regards the culpability principle; that is, that no one should be punished if they lack a culpable
mental state.17 Many, such as Schabas, Ohlin, and van Sliedregt, believe the culpability principle
is particularly violated when liability for genocide is alleged under a JCE III theory. As will be
shown below, this criticism seems to have especially resonated with at least some members of
the ICTY judiciary, as evidenced in the cases of Krstic and Blagojevic. Some scholars, like
Danner and Martinez, believe that the lowered mens rea accompanying JCE III ultimately risks
deteriorating criminal liability into guilt by association.18

15

van Sliedregt , supra at FN 3, at 190.
William A. Schabas, The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the Major Rulings of the International Criminal
Tribunal over the Past Decade: Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1015 (2003). [reproduced at Tab 58] at 1033. Mr. Schabas is an internationally known
authority on international criminal law, especially in matters concerning war crimes, and has written and consulted
extensively on these issues. He is presently the Director of the Irish Center for Human Rights and a Professor of
Human Rights law at the National University of Ireland.
17
Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise – Criminal Liability be Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial
Creativity?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 606 (June 2004).[reproduced at Tab ][hereinafter Powles] at 616. Mr. Powles
is a former Associate Legal Officer of the ICTY Chambers, and has appeared as defense counsel in matters before
the ICTY and SCSL.
18
Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005) [reproduced at Tab
34] [hereinafter Danner and Martinez] at 110. Danner and Martinez are Law Professors responsible for co-authoring
the seminal article on JCE, one which has been cited innumerable times since, and whose methodical analytical
approach to the issue first outlined many of the criticisms echoed by subsequent writers on the subject.
16

7

And like many other commentators, Danner and Martinez express serious reservations as
to whether the rationale in the Tadic case relied upon weak legal precedent from the Post-World
War II courts to erroneous find JCE III. It is precisely the specific “extended liability” of JCE III
that has caused concern amongst the academic community. Steven Powles, like Danner and
Martinez, believes that sufficient legal precedent exists to find JCE categories I and II were
customary international law by the 1990’s, but feels that JCE III is the result of “judicial
creativity.”19
While there are those who would advocate abandoning the mode of commission
altogether, it is nonetheless well established in international criminal law at this point. However,
the ICTY has begun to reign in the use of the JCE Doctrine, likely in an attempt to placate many
of the concerns expressed above. The areas of restriction will be explored below, with special
attention paid to the Blagojevic decision, and its practical import for Prosecutors.

19
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III. The Current Status of the Legality of the Criminal Liability Theory of Joint Criminal
Enterprise in Light of the Most Recent International Criminal Law Jurisprudence.
A. The ICTY has Generally Limited JCE Liability to Conform with the Culpability
Principle
The trend within the jurisprudence of the ICTY seems to indicate quite clearly that the
Tribunal is tightening the loose ends of JCE liability, much to the chagrin of Prosecutors who
have quite been quite generous with the application of the doctrine to their indictments.
Specifically, the ICTY has required notice of JCE allegations in prosecutor’s indictments, and
has required the Prosecutor to identify with a degree of specificity, the parameters of the group
and of the group’s criminal plan. The ICTY has continued to find liability for relatively small
contributions to a criminal plan, and has been liberal with finding a new JCE, in instances where
a JCE has been satisfactorily established. In the case of allegations involving specific intent
crimes, the ICTY has refused to convict based upon liability incurred via constructive intent
under a JCE theory. This fact, however, can be seen as applying only to this distinct category of
crimes, and as such, JCE III liability otherwise remains a form of commission endorsed by the
Tribunal.
1. The ICTY now requires adequate notice of a charge of JCE in an indictment.
The Trial Chamber found the Defendant in Simic had participated in a JCE designed to
persecute non-Serbs in northern Bosnia through detention in inhumane conditions, torture, and
sexual assault. On October 17, 2003 the Trial Chamber sentenced Simic to 17 years in prison.20
On appeal, Simic argued that he had not been informed of the JCE charge.
The Appeals Chamber agreed, finding that Simic had not been informed of the JCE
charge until after the prosecution had rested its case, and that Simic’s trial was therefore unfair.21

20
21

Prosecutor v. Simic, IT-95-9-A, Judgment of 28 November 2006, [reproduced at Tab XX][hereinafter “Simic”].
Id.

9

As a result, Simic’s conviction for persecution was reversed. The charges relating to aiding and
abetting persecution based upon unlawful detention of non-Serbs, detention in inhumane
conditions, and forced labor and displacement were upheld.22 The sentence was correspondingly
reduced to a total of 15 years. The fact that the ICTY requires a Prosecutor to allege JCE in an
indictment seems odd considering JCE was not plead in the Tadic case where it first appeared,
and where the judges of the Appeals Chamber effectively read the charge into the indictment. In
all likelihood, given the criticisms of the relatively unrestricted use and application of the JCE
Doctrine, this simply evidences the desire by the Tribunal to put a finer point on JCE and to
ensure its legitimacy for future use and the historical record of the actions of the Tribunal. This
doesn’t necessarily seem a particularly inequitable restriction either, since the JCE Doctrine has
been used by the Prosecutor’s office for many years, and it could be argued that it is not
unreasonable to require the Prosecution to specify an allegation of JCE at the indictment stage.
For a number of reasons then this restriction upon prosecutorial use of JCE can be expected to
ruffle relatively few feathers going forward. The same many not be said, however, of other
limitations that have been imposed by the Tribunal.
2. The ICTY has increased the threshold for a Prosecutor seeking to establish the
existence of a JCE by requiring more specific allegations regarding the participants
in the JCE and the limits of their plan.
The ICTY has also worked to specify precisely what situations will meet the elements of
JCE liability. In Limaj, the Prosecution failed to establish the existence of a JCE to “target Serb
civilians and perceived Albanian collaborators for intimidation, imprisonment, violence, and
murder.”23 The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecution had not provided sufficient evidence of
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the existence of the alleged JCE because the Prosecution could not demonstrate that a group,
whose identities could be established by reference to the group or any other form of group
identity, furthered a common plan, or had even developed such a plan.24 Lacking a group identity
or evidence of a common plan, the basic elements of a JCE had not been satisfied.25
In Krnojelac, the Appeals Chamber further restricted the application of JCE liability by
holding that “using the concept of joint criminal enterprise to define an individual’s
responsibility for crimes physically committed by others requires a strict definition of common
purpose.” 26 A JCE should also identify, to the greatest extent possible, the principal perpetrators
of the alleged crime.27
In the Brdjanin case one of the alternative theories pled by the Prosecution was the
Defendant’s participation in a JCE that also included the leadership of the Serbian Democratic
Party (SDS), members of the Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK), members of the Army
(VRS) of the Republika Srpska (RS), and members of Serb paramilitary forces.28 The
Prosecution alleged that the purpose of the JCE was “the permanent forcible removal of Bosnian
Muslim and Bosnian Croat inhabitants from the territory of the planned Bosnian Serb state.”
This broad definition necessarily included a wide range of crimes which were committed by a
large group of diverse perpetrators, and which occurred over an extended period of time. 29 The
Trial Chamber, consistent with the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac (discussed
below), required the Defendant and perpetrators to possess the same mental state towards the
International Criminal Tribunals, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 623, (July 2006), [reproduced at tab XX][hereinafter
“Developments July 2006”].
24
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crimes the JCE allegedly planned to commit for a JCE I conviction.30 The effect of this ruling
was to limit the Prosecution’s broadly defined JCE to those crimes to which the Prosecution was
able to establish a mental state, and to require the Prosecution to define the JCE more
specifically in order to make such a connection.
3. The ICTY has required more evidence of the existence of an agreement amongst
the JCE participants.
The extent of agreement necessary to satisfy the elements of JCE liability have been a
subject of much debate, and were finally explored in Brdjanin. For a JCE III charge, the Trial
Chamber in required the Prosecution to “prove that the Accused entered into an agreement with a
person to commit a particular crime… and that this same person physically committed another
crime, which was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of the crime agreed
upon.”31 The Trial Chamber set the bar much higher by requiring that the Prosecution be able to
prove the existence of an “explicit agreement or understanding” between the Defendant and the
principal perpetrators of the crime charge by holding:
it is not sufficient to prove an understanding or agreement to commit a crime
between the Accused and a person in charge or in control of a military or
paramilitary unit committing a crime. The Accused can only be held criminally
responsible under the mode of liability of JCE if the Prosecution establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had an understanding or entered into an
agreement with the Relevant Physical Perpetrators to commit the particular
crime eventually perpetrated or if the crime perpetrated by the Relevant
Physical Perpetrators is a natural and foreseeable consequence of the crime
agreed upon by the Accused and the Relevant Physical Perpetrators.32
The Prosecution appealed the decision of the Trial Chamber that the Defendant was not
guilty of participating in a JCE because the actual perpetrator of the crime was not a member of
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the JCE. 33 The Prosecution also challenged the fact that Trial Chamber required the prosecution
to prove a specific agreement existed between the physical perpetrator of the crime and the
Accused JCE member to commit the target crime.34 The Appeals Chamber reversed both of these
holdings because they unduly restricted the use of JCE.35 Some have predicted that the ruling of
the Appeals Chamber opens up a number of possibilities for JCE charges in the future, including
establishing liability even where there is no evidence of an agreement between a JCE member
and the perpetrator of the target crime, or when one member of the JCE utilizes a person outside
the JCE to commit the target crime.36 This does not seem quite as drastic as it initially sounds,
since the Defendant in Brdjanin was still culpable for the crimes committed, and any instance
where culpability cannot be established is likely to be seen as too tenuous a connection to be
sufficient for the Court for a conviction.
4. A new JCE can be established by the continued participation in the original JCE.
One area where JCE liability has not been restricted pertains to the commission of new
crimes that change the fundamental nature of the original JCE, so as to create an entirely new
platform of liability for the participants. On September 27, 2006, Momailo Krajisnik was
sentenced to 27 in prison after being convicted for persecutions, murder, extermination,
deportation, and forced transfer of non-Serb civilians. 37 Krajisnik’s liability resulted from a JCE
that intended to reduce the proportion of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the
population. To achieve their ends, Krajisnik and his co-perpetrators killed and mistreated people
with the goal of instilling terror.38 Further, they destroyed and appropriated property of Bosnian
33
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Muslims and Croats to prevent those removed from the ‘cleansed’ areas from returning.39
Because of his senior position, Krajisnik was found to play a vital role in the commission of the
crimes.40 Significantly, Krajisnik was found liable for crimes that may not have been an original
part of the JCE, but under JCE1 liability because:
[a]n expansion of the criminal means of the objective is proven,
when leading members of the JCE are informed of new types of
crime committed pursuant to the implementation of the common
objective of the JCE. Where this holds, JCE members are shown
to have accepted the expansion of means, since implementation
of the common objective can no longer be understood to be limited
to commission of the original crimes. With acceptance of the actual
commission of new types of crime and continued contribution to
the objective, comes intent, meaning that subsequent commission
of such crimes by the JCE will give rise to liability under JCE form 1.41
Thus, when a JCE is occurring, and the nature of the crimes being committed is expanded, but all
members continue on in the commission of the original crimes, those new crimes are seen by the
Court as having been incorporated into the JCE, and are categorized as JCE1 rather than being
construed as a foreseeable further crime, invoking JCE III liability.

5. The ICTY has been more lenient with the level of contribution required to incur
JCE liability.
The Appeals Chamber has been much more lenient with required level of actual
participation of the Defendant in the JCE for conviction. While the Appeals Chamber has
established a fairly rigid threshold for the prosecution to establish the existence of a legitimate
JCE, once that JCE has been established an Defendant may incur liability based upon their
commission of acts that are “in some way … directed to the furthering of the common
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purpose”.42 The amount of participation necessary for a charge of aiding and abetting may
actually surpass that of a JCE in that, among other things, a Defendant need not be physically
present when the crime is being committed.43
6. The ICTY has heightened the mens rea requirements for JCE liability.
Liability for JCE has seen the most significant changes of late in the area of mental state.
By and large, the Tribunal has worked to restrict the application of JCE liability, perhaps in
reference to the many criticisms offered by the academic world towards the doctrine. As the
prevailing concerns among supporters and opponents of JCE liability alike relate to the
blameworthiness of those convicted under a theory of JCE liability, it seems only natural that the
Tribunal would focus on the mental state of an actor, where so much of the blame is deemed to
originate.
The Krnojelac Appeal illustrates the Tribunal’s efforts to restrict JCE liability to ensure
that blameworthiness of participants is sufficient to support a conviction. In Krnojelac, the
prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber had erred by requiring each member of the JCE to
have the same mental state towards the crime being committed.44 The Prosecution argued that
this effectively made it impossible to convict those high-level leaders who are responsible for
planning widespread attacks against civilians and other non-combatants, but who have no contact
with the soldiers or paramilitary forces that actually perpetrate the crimes. 45 This might be
especially true if the perpetrators were not informed of the role they were playing in the plan, or
if they were ignorant of the fact that their targets were not of a legitimate military nature.46 In
42
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responding, the Appeals Chamber seemed to suggest that the Prosecution had missed the point of
what actually constituted a legitimate JCE allegation. The Appeals Chamber responded:
apart from the specific case of the extended form of joint criminal
enterprise, the very concept of joint criminal enterprise presupposes
that its participants, other than the principal perpetrator(s) of the crimes
committed, share the perpetrator’s joint criminal intent…The Appeals
Chamber also notes that the example given by the Prosecution in
support of its argument on this point appears more relevant to the
planning of a crime under Article 7(1) of the Statute than to
joint criminal enterprise.47
Babic, while not restricting mens rea requirements, nonetheless evinces an attempt by the
Tribunal to set parameters for liability tied to mental state, and to formulate a predictable and just
rule. In this case, the Defendant plead guilty to participating in a JCE whose purpose was to
discriminate on political, religious, or racial grounds, in order to forcibly and permanently
remove the non-Serb population from approximately one-third of the territory of Croatia.48 This
was intended to create a Serb dominated region, ultimately to be incorporated into a Greater
Serbia.49 Babic challenged the 13-year sentence imposed by Trial Chamber I, pursuant to a
comment made by the Trial Chamber that Babic’s guilt was not diminished by the fact that he
did not intend the murders of the victims, but was merely aware that the murders were
happening.50
Clarifying the mens rea necessary for conviction under JCE III, the Appeals Chamber
noted that the Defendant need not intend the secondary crimes, so long as the Defendant
intended the initial crime, the secondary crimes were foreseeable, and the Defendant “willingly
undertook the risk that they would be committed.”51 As Babic had admitted to intending to
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commit the initial crime, the murders were a foreseeable outgrowth of the original crime, and
Babic undertook the risk that these secondary crimes could occur and the he would be held liable
for them.52 Not only did Babic willingly undertake the risk that they would occur, he admitted to
knowing the crimes were being committed. As such, this was more than sufficient to find the
mens rea requirements in respect of secondary crimes under a JCE III had been satisfied.
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber was correct in not reducing Babic’s
sentence because he did not intend the secondary crimes.53 The sentence was perfectly
appropriate.

7. Blagojevic and Krstic can be construed narrowly to apply only in cases where the
Prosecution alleges genocide.

The Trial Chamber in Blagojevic tried the Defendant for liability arising from a JCE
alleged to intend the forcible transfer and removal of women and children from the Srebrenica
enclave.54 The Prosecution had originally alleged the existence of another JCE which planned to
“capture, detain, summarily execute by firing squad, bury, and rebury, thousands Bosnian
Muslim men and boys aged 16 to 60 from Srebrenica enclave.”55 The Defendant’s liability for
this crime was determined by the Court to be ill-suited to JCE liability as the Trial Chamber did
not believe Blagojevic was responsible for “committing” those crimes.56 As such, the Trial
Chamber only evaluated the Defendant’s liability for JCE insofar as it arose in reference to the
charge of forceful transfers of women and children.57
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The Trial Chamber found the fact that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the forceful transfers occurred.58 The Trial Chamber subsequently examined whether or not
a plurality of persons participated in the alleged JCE, and found that VRS and MUP officers
participated in the JCE, satisfying the first criteria regarding the existence of a JCE. 59 The Trial
Chamber also found the existence of a common plan, that relating to forced transfer and
advocated by the Prosecution. 60 The Defendant was also found to have participated in the
common plan, thus establishing all three necessary elements of the actus reas of a JCE.61
However, when the Trial Chamber examined whether the Defendant shared the intent of the
other participants to commit the forcible transfer, the Trial Chamber found that the Defendant
lacked the requisite mens rea for conviction.62
Perhaps the most disconcerting part of the Trial Chamber’s finding is that it did not
discuss, or provide any rationale for, the construed lack of Defendant’s intent. The Trial
Chamber dismissed this crucial component of the ruling, simply stating that it believed the
Defendant’s liability was more appropriately that of an aider and abettor. 63 Needless to say, the
Prosecution appealed on this point, amongst others, contending that:
if properly considered, the evidence and the findings on
Blagojevic’s role in making life unbearable in the Srebrenica
enclave as well as his participation in the “Krivaja 95” operation,
knowing its stated purpose, lead to the only reasonable
conclusion that Blagojevic shared the intent to commit forcible
transfer.64
On appeal, the Prosecution further advanced the position that the Trial Chamber placed undue
focus on Blagojevic’s knowledge, at the expense of the evidence indicating his extensive
58
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involvement in the JCE.65 The Appeals Chamber however deemed this constructed intent to be
overly expansive, and unconvincing.66 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber found that though the
Trial Chamber had concluded Blagojevic was aware that members of his brigade were actively
checking the convoys and blocking supplies to the Srebrenica enclave, that does not mean the
Blagojevic necessarily supported the plan to commit the forcible transfer; thus he lacked the
requisite mens rea for conviction under JCE liability.67
The judgment of the Trial and Appeals Chambers in Blagojevic thus provides limited
guidance regarding the difference in mental state attributable to Blagojevic and why his liability
was considered that of an aider and abettor as opposed to a co-perpetrator. The case has many
similarities to the Krstic case, which Danner and Martinez believe evinces the discomfort judges
have with prosecutorial theories that advance direct responsibility under JCE rather than
command responsibility or accomplice liability found in a charge of aiding and abetting in cases
of specific intent crimes like genocide.68 In Krstic, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that the
Defendant was not likely to have instigated a genocidal plot on his own, and that he did not
personally participate in any of the killings. 69 Still, the Trial Chamber found Krstic intentionally
provided support to the JCE that was occurring and that he was guilty as a co-perpetrator of the
JCE as a result.70 The Appeals Chamber reversed, overturning the Trial Chamber’s factual
finding that Krstic had intended to participate in a JCE to commit genocide based upon Krstic’s
knowledge that: 1) General Mladic intended to execute the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, and
2) that Drina Corps personnel (the segment of the Bosnian Serb Army over which Krstic
65
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exercised control) had participated in the massacre.71 The Appeals Chamber found that Krstic’s
liability was most properly expressed as an aider and abettor to genocide and not as a perpetrator
thereof.72
Danner and Martinez attribute this to the fact that Krstic clearly played a “less culpable
role” in the massacres that took place than that of others more directly involved.73 Moreover,
Danner and Martinez see the decision as vindicating the culpability principle of criminal law by
tailoring liability to a Defendant’s individual actions, and furthering the success and legitimacy
of the Tribunals overall.74
The significance of fact that the Prosecutor alleged genocide in both cases is further noted
by Schabas as well, who states that only “a mere handful of the initial indictments before the
ICTY included the charge of genocide.”75 Of those cases, in only Krstic and Blagojevic did the
Tribunal convict, and as noted above, it was only when JCE liability was replaced with liability
incurred as one who aided and abetted in the commission of a crime. This likely implies that the
limitation on JCE III and constructed liability is specific to indictments alleging genocide or
other specific intent crimes. Moreover, this would make sense given the number of experts who
have provided compelling arguments that JCE III liability should not be applicable in such
situations because constructive liability is in direct contradiction to requirement of specific intent
as a mental state required for conviction.
B. The ICTR has not yet followed the ICTY in restricting the ability of the Prosecutor
to use JCE
71
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The recent jurisprudence of the ICTR has dealt with some of the same issues as the
ICTY, which should come as no surprise considering the frequency with which the ICTR cites
cases from the ICTY as indication of legal precedent. However, the ICTR has instead preferred
to define the doctrine without significantly restricting its use by the Prosecution; in contrast, the
ICTR has even arguably expanded certain elements of the doctrine
1. The ICTR has distinguished JCE from liability incurred as a result of aiding and
abetting the commission of a crime.
Two cases discussing the difference between JCE liability and accessorial liability
provide a similar standard of notice in charging documents as that applied by the ICTY. In
Karamera, the Prosecution tried to argue that genocide and complicity in genocide are actually
two separate crimes, and that as a result, complicity in genocide could be accomplished through
a JCE. 76 The Trial Chamber however held that JCE and complicity are simply two ways of
committing a crime, in this case, genocide.77 It would not be possible to commit complicity in a
genocide by participation in a JCE; the crime, genocide, would be either be accomplished by a
JCE, or the Defendant would be found to be an accomplice to genocide. This stands to reason as
one cannot be both the perpetrator of the crime and an accomplice to the crime.
This topic was also discussed in the Mpambara case, involving the former bourgmestre
of Rukara Commune. He was alleged to have participated in a JCE to destroy the Tutsi
throughout Rwanda, and to have ordered, instigated, and aided and abetted the crimes.78
However, the Trial Chamber found that in the pleadings, the Prosecution tried to allege that the
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Defendant had aided and abetted the perpetrators of a JCE.79 The Court noted that this confused
the types of alleged in each charge; JCE is a form of direct individual liability for a crime where
as aiding and abetting is a form of accomplice liability.80 As such, the Trial Court determined
that it was necessary to decide whether the Defendant engaged in a JCE, or aided and abetted
others who were committing a crime.
One area where JCE has arguably been limited is in the notice requirement for a proper
pleading so as to give a Defendant sufficient warning of the charges being levied against them.
In Gacumbitsi, the Appeals Chamber held that a pleading lacking the specific language of a JCE
allegation was not defective as a matter of law.81 What mattered was whether or not the
Defendant had received adequate notice of the charge through other similar language. In this
case, the phrase “acted in concert” was not deemed sufficient to express an allegation that the
Defendant was liable under a JCE theory.
2. The ICTR has not limited broad-based JCE allegations put forth by the
Prosecution.
The ICTR has also recently issued decisions covering similar legal topics as the ICTY,
but have often arrived at different conclusions than its sister Tribunal. The ICTR has addressed
the elements of the actus reus of JCE liability. The Appeals Chamber in Karamera found that
JCE III was firmly established in customary international law by 1994, the year during which the
ICTR exercised temporal jurisdiction.82 It held that JCE liability is not subject to geographic
boundaries, thus, a JCE can occur across a vast scale. The Chamber further held that since JCE
III liability may only be imposed for crimes that were foreseeable to the Defendant, and that in
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some instances there may be crimes committed that were not foreseeable to the Defendant, that
the argument that allowing such a vast scale turns JCE III effectively into a strict liability crime
does not hold weight.83 The scale will, however, be considered in any analysis of what crimes
may have been foreseeable to the Defendant.84
3. The ICTR has been willing to impute intent based upon the context in which a
participant acted.

On December 3, 2005, Trial Chamber I ruled in Simba that the Defendant participated
with local leaders and other prominent persons in a JCE to kill Tutsi civilians at three sites on
April 21, 1994.85 The attacks took place over 12 hours and resulted in the deaths of thousands of
Tutsis.86 Because the attacks took place with an efficiency that indicated a “highly coordinated
operation”, the Trial Chamber found that the only reasonable explanation for their effectiveness
was the existence of a prior plan involving a plurality of persons.87 Though the Trial Chamber
did not accept the Prosecution’s position that Simba had personally participated in the attacks, it
did find that he was nonetheless a participant in the JCE. Specifically, he was found to have been
present during the attacks, provided ammunition and weapons to the attackers, and to have urged
the attackers to “get rid of the filth.”88 As such, the Trial Court found the evidence supported a
finding that Simba shared the attackers’ intent to kill Tutsi, and he was thus found guilty of
genocide.89
Simba had argued that because of his “close association with Tutsi” and the fact that he
held more moderate views than the hard-line Hutu extremists, he could not be found to harbor
83
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the requisite specific intent necessary for a finding of genocide.90 The Trial Court held that while
it did not believe he was a proponent of Hutu extremism, the evidence nonetheless indicated that
“the only reasonable conclusion, even accepting [the Defendant’s] submissions as true, is that at
that moment, he acted with genocidal intent.”91 Evidence of politically moderate views, held the
Trial Chamber, does not prevent a finding that a Defendant acted with the requisite intent at a
particular time, especially in light of the scale and context of the massacres that took place.92
An expansion of the ability of the Prosecution to apply JCE liability arises when a ruling
that initially seems inconsequential is combined with the Akayesu ruling, with interesting
implications. In an interlocutory appeal in Prosecutor v. Karemera, the Appeals Chamber held
for the first time that the existence of a nationwide genocide against the Tutsi and Moderate
Hutus in 1994 was a “fact of common knowledge” trial chambers must take notice of.93 Though
this decision has no doubt been a welcome one for many Rwandans, Heller notes that it could
lead to problematic changes in the burden of proof required of prosecutors in genocide cases,
particularly in those cases alleging the existence of a JCE upon which the Accused’s guilt is
founded.94
The problem with this finding of common knowledge arises when the Karemera holding
is combined with that of Akayesu.95 In Ayakesu, which is “consistently cited with approval by the
ICTR,” the trial chamber held that “the defendant’s specific intent can be inferred from the
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actions of others.”96 The trial chamber held that this is possible from the “general context of the
perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group.”97 Further,
this inference can be used to deduce the Defendant’s intent from the existence of a national
campaign of genocide.98 Because of this, the holdings in Karemera and Akayesu might form a
lethal pair. In order to establish a Defendant’s specific intent, all a prosecutor would have to do is
request the trial chamber to take judicial notice of the national campaign of genocide.99 From the
existence of such a national campaign, according to Akayesu, an individual defendant’s intent
can thus be inferred, and the prosecution would not be required to introduce any actual evidence
to establish this.100
This prejudicial outcome could have a tremendous impact on cases where the defendant
is charged with indirect participation in a crime, particularly in those alleging the existence of a
JCE. 101 By establishing the existence of a national campaign of genocide, for example, one
would immediately satisfy the first element of JCE, which requires the existence of a common
plan.102 Because the Defendant’s intent has already been inferred from the existence of a national
plan to commit genocide, the next two elements, requiring that the Defendant participate in the
plan, with the intent to further the plan, could be satisfied with the most “ambiguous act of
‘assistance, encouragement, or moral support’” to infer the defendant’s participation and support
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of the plan.103 The outcome of such a scenario would be questionable convictions, and
unacceptable infringements upon the rights of the Defendant to a fair trial.104
C. The status of JCE in the SCSL is unsettled, with some signs pointing towards an
expansive view on the doctrine and others a more restrictive application.
Of the three tribunals, the jurisprudence of the SCSL is by far the least developed, and as
one would reasonably expect, the doctrine of JCE liability is much less settled in this tribunal, by
comparison. Nonetheless, the SCSL has addressed issues regarding the adequacy of notice
provided to a Defendant in the indictment. One of the major (and only) cases discussing JCE
liability in the SCSL is that of the Prosecutor v. The CDF, and which deals precisely with this
issue. 105
1. The SCSL has allowed a liberal pleading of JCE.
In this case, the defense first challenged the manner in which JCE was pleaded by the
Prosecutor, as arising under Article 6(1) of the Statute, and triggering “liability of committing,
planning, instigating, ordering, aiding and abetting and participation in a joint criminal
enterprise.” 106 Defense counsel urged the Court that the Prosecutor had done little more than
simply repeat the language of the statute, and that he was required to identify the “course of
conduct through which Fofana could be understood as having committed, planned, instigated,
ordered, aided and abetted or participated in a JCE.”107 Fofana’s defense further argued that the
fact that since he was not named in the factual descriptions preceding each count, that he was
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really being charged as a superior, and that superior liability is contradicted by the repeated
references to Article 6(1) which establishes individual liability for criminal acts.108
Defense for Fofana also challenged the adequacy of the indictment’s specificity.
Nowhere did the indictment indicate the names of the co-conspirators, or the identities of the
victims. 109 Nor did the indictment indicate any specifics of the alleged JCE. Missing were the
form of the JCE alleged, the criminal purpose of the alleged JCE, the identity of the coperpetrators, especially of the individuals who actually perpetrated the crime, and the nature of
the Defendant’s participation in the enterprise.110 Fofana specifically alleged that the lack of
allegations regarding who personally carried out the crimes prejudiced him to the point of
preventing him from being able to answer the charges against him.111
The Court’s response to these allegations was direct. First, the Court noted that the degree
of specificity required in pleadings would be subject to factors the Court had previously
established, including where the crimes had an international character.112
The SCSL announced that the Prosecution “possessed the discretion to plead all the
different heads of responsibility under Article 6(1),” and that the Prosecution would carry the
burden of proving each at trial.113 Secondly, the Court stated that the “sheer scale of the
offences” may make identifying the identities of the victims nearly impossible, and that past
decisions have not found such flaws to be fatal to the Prosecution’s case.114 The fact that the
Prosecution identified the alleged co-perpetrators by group affiliation was no more problematic
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as group identifications had been found sufficient in the past.115 Ultimately, the Court found the
objections of the Defense to be unfounded, and that the perceived flaws of the indictment did not
prejudice the ability of the Defendant to defend themselves against the charges as levied.116
2. The SCSL has unduly restricted JCE liability by requiring that an alleged JCE be
criminal in nature at its inception.
Another trial, that dealing with the ARC Accused, also discussed the pleading of JCE
liability, although in terms of the substance of the indictment, rather than whether or not the
indictment provided the Defense with adequate notice of the charges brought against it.117 The
problem arose with the manner in which the Prosecution alleged JCE liability, and not, it must be
noted, with the doctrine itself.118 In the AFRC case, the Prosecution alleged a JCE existed
between the AFRC and RUF to “take any actions necessary to gain and exercise political power
and control over the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond mining areas.”119
Because these actions do not constitute a crime in and of themselves, they cannot be said to
support JCE liability.
Thus, though it is much too early to tell precisely what form JCE liability will assume in
the SCSL, and whether it will follow in the footsteps of the ICTY or ICTR, it is safe to say that it
at least possesses a legitimacy in the eyes of the tribunal, and will no doubt play a central role in
future cases before the tribunal.
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IV. It can be argued that JCE Theory Was Part of Customary International Law in 1975.
A. Tadic Analysis
Cassese has noted that the doctrine of JCE has become a “consolidated” concept in
international law, owing to its application in the various international and hybrid tribunals that
have emerged since the establishment of the ICTY.120 While the present status of JCE may be
established, though still subject to criticisms regarding the extended liability of JCE III, the
question about whether it existed in customary international law in the early 1990’s when gross
human rights violations were occurring in the former Yugoslavia, required an extensive analysis
of those Nuremburg-era precedents. That analysis occurred in the now seminal Tadic Appeal.
The issue is whether or not the Tadic analysis addresses a situation sufficiently analogous
to that of Cambodia in 1975, such that the Tadic analysis can be used to support the argument
that JCE can be applied by the ECCC as a mode of individual responsibility for crimes
committed by the Khmer Rouge. If so, then logic would dictate that it would also have been
customary international law in 1975 because legal precedents were established in the realm of
international criminal law in the years between 1975 and the early 1990’s. And since the Tadic
analysis relied upon precedents established in the immediate aftermath of World War II, those
precedents were certainly just as valid in 1975 as they were fifteen years later.
1. The Facts of the Tadic Case.
First, the facts of the case are necessary to understand the context of the decision. Dusko
Tadic had lived in a multi-ethnic community prior to the break up of the country of Yugoslavia.
He owned a café and, as a result, knew the local population well. He rose to the position of local
party leader of the Serbian Democratic Society in the Prijedor municipality of Bosnia and
Herzegovina because he was able to help the Serb forces identify local non-Serbs for expulsion
120
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and resettlement. At the trial level, Tadic was convicted on several counts of crimes against
humanity and war crimes and sentenced to 20 years in prison. However, he was acquitted in the
murder of 5 Muslim men in the Bosnian village of Jaskici. The trial court found that, although it
had been determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Tadic had been a member of the armed men
that had searched the village for Muslim men, and that the five men were found shot to death
after the group (of which Tadic was a member) left the village, the court could not establish
“beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had any part in the killing of the five men.” The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the “only reasonable conclusion the Trial Chamber could
have drawn is that the armed group to which [Tadic] belonged killed the five men.” Direct
evidence linking Tadic to the murders did not exist, but the Appeals Chamber nonetheless found
that Tadic had acted pursuant to a common criminal design and was liable under Article 7(1) of
the ICTY Statute. Specifically, Tadic had intended to further the criminal purpose “to rid the
Prijedor region of the non-Serb population, by committing inhuman acts against them” and he
was aware that it was foreseeable, and knowingly took the risk that the group would kill nonSerbs in effecting this criminal purpose. This finding however required an explanation of how
liability could be found in the lack of direct evidence.
2. The Appeals Chamber Rationale Supporting JCE Liability under Customary
International Law

The Appeals Chamber in Tadic began by examining Article 7(1) of the Statute of the
ICTY, holding that it “does not exclude those modes of participating in the commission of
crimes which occur where several persons having a common purpose embark on criminal
activity that is then carried out either jointly or by some members of this plurality of persons.” 121
The Appeals Tribunal found that the crimes enumerated in the Statute of the ICTY may be
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committed by more than one person, and that such crimes may involve persons other than the
physical perpetrator.122 This was supported by the fact that in addition to simply committing a
crime, one could be guilty of planning, ordering, and aiding and abetting.123 These are clearly
instances in which a person does not actually physically perpetrate the crime, but is nonetheless
held to a degree of responsibility for its commission. Thus a person need not carry out the crime
in order to be considered a co-perpetrator. This is underscored by the fact that Articles 2 and 4 of
the Geneva Conventions include similar wording, providing for the punishment of ordering, as
well as for conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity.124 The Appeals Chamber
differentiated this type of liability from the idea of “guilt by association” and, satisfied that a
crime could be committed by the actions of a group of individuals, looked to see if there was
support for JCE in customary international law in the early 1990’s when the crimes were
committed.
a. JCE I and JCE II: Based in an Individual’s Participation and Mens Rea
In its analysis, the Appeals Chamber relied upon a number of cases decided in the
immediate aftermath of the horrors of World War II to find support for JCE liability. The
Appeals Chamber examined the case law of the Post-World War II War Crimes Tribunals and
found what it believed to be three categories of liability that could be incurred by group criminal
activity. The Appeals Chamber found support for the proposition that crimes committed by
groups could still lead to punishments for individual members of those groups, provided those
individuals intentionally participated in the guilty groups or organizations. In the Almelo case the
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Appeals Chamber noted that in that case three Germans who had killed a British prisoner of war
and a Dutch civilian were all guilty of murder under the doctrine of “common enterprise.”125 In
the case, the Appeals Chamber found that all clearly had the intent to kill, though the participants
played different roles, and that they were necessarily co-perpetrators in the eyes of the law.
Similarly, in Jepsen the Judge Advocate accepted the position that if Jepsen participated in the
murder of approximately 80 persons, then the deaths of all could be “laid at his door and at the
door of any single man who was in any way assisting in that act.”126 The Appeals Chamber
quoted the Judge Advocate in Schonfeld who noted:
if several persons combine for an unlawful purpose or for a
lawful purpose to be effected by unlawful means, and one of
them in carrying out that purpose, kills a man, it is murder in
all who are present […] provided that the death was caused
by a member of the party in the course of his endeavors to
effect the common object of the assembly.127

The Appeals Chamber also cited the Ponzano Case for the proposition that crimes may be
committed by indirect participation, as long as the perpetrator is a “cog in the wheel of events
leading up to the result which in fact occurred,” and that liability may be incurred by “giving
orders for a criminal offence to be committed” as well as a variety of other means.128 Still, the
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Appeals Chamber noted, the Judge Advocate required that the perpetrator possessed knowledge
as to the criminal purpose of the enterprise.129
This form of JCE liability is generally without a great deal of significant criticism, and
can safely be said to have been a part of customary international law at the time the World War
II era crimes were committed. Indeed, Powles asserts that it is “easy to see” how a person who
participates in a JCE with the intent to commit the crime is concurrently guilty of “committing”
the crime. This approach clearly also comports with the culpability principle as well.
Additionally, van der Wilt, believing common law conspiracy crimes to be the underpinning for
JCE liability, notes that the common understanding amongst the parties warrants attribution of
the group conduct to all participants.130
b. JCE III: Extended Liablity based upon Foreseeability
In the Essen Lynching Case a crowd of German civilians participated in the beating and
eventual killing of three British soldiers while the British soldiers were under the escort of a
German soldier. The British Military Court found that since determining who actually dealt the
death-blow was impossible, if any attacker had the intent to kill, then they were guilty of murder.
The Appeals Chamber believed that this case supported the doctrine of JCE liability by
establishing common action and mens rea, and by finding all the participants guilty of the
murder. Another case on which the Appeals Chamber relied heavily was the Post WWII
D’Ottavio Case, which involved the shooting of an escaped prisoner during the course of an
“illegal restraint” in Italy.131 Because it was foreseeable that one of the participants might shoot
and kill the prisoner as a part of their common criminal plan, all were found guilty of
129
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manslaughter132 Satisfied that these cases supported the notion of individual criminal
responsibility when the Defendant may not have been the actual perpetrator of the crime at issue,
the Appeals Chamber subsequently formally defined the three types of JCE, as well as the three
requirements that must be met for each.
c. Critics have attacked the Assertion that a Sprawling Form of JCE Liability is
supported by the Jurisprudence of the Post-World War II Tribunals.
A number of leading academics have taken issue with the Tadic decision, particularly
regarding the establishment of the still contentious JCE III. Ohlin, for one, believes that the
Appeals Chamber in Tadic committed grave errors in its reasoning regarding JCE III. 133 He
contends that the Appeals Chamber began with the faulty premise that guilt exists, and then they
work backwards to find it. 134 Danner and Martinez also believe that the Appeals Chamber made
this mistake, which they attribute to the inappropriate importation of human rights law into the
arena of international criminal law.
Danner and Martinez also maintain that the cases cited by Tadic do not support the
“sprawling” form of JCE, and that in reality, the cases cited by the Appeals Chamber either fall
into one of two general categories: those of groups of German soldiers and citizens murdering
Allied Prisoners of War, or those relating to Concentration Camp participants.135 The closest
equivalent to the extended form of liability under JCE III, they believe, is to be found in the
prosecution of membership in a criminal organization, and of prosecution of conspiracy, neither
of which was utilized without controversy.136
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Danner and Martinez note that the United Nations War Crimes Commission reporter of
the Essen Case, upon which the Appeals Chamber relied in Tadic, did not explicitly state the
legal basis for the conviction of the Accused.137 Powles raised the same concern. He suggested
that the Essen Court actually did find intent to murder on the part of the Defendants.138 Danner
and Martinez also note that the Prosecutor in the Essen Case did not specify a common design,
purpose, or plan in the indictment, further muddying the actual basis for the conviction.139 The
case that Ohlin contends may provide support for JCE III liability, D’Ottavio, was an appeal
from the Italian Court of Cassation, and on its own, simply can not be sufficient to support the
allegation that JCE III was customary international law at the time. The Appeals Chamber found,
however, that these cases do sufficiently support the notion that JCE III liability was a part of
customary international law at the time Tadic committed his crimes, and as will be discussed
below, at least one prominent legal scholar agrees with them.140
Danner and Martinez do allow that the prisoner of war mob violence cases, of which the
Essen Lynching case is but one example, provide support for common purpose liability,
particularly as applied to the Tadic case.141 What the cited cases do not support is “sweeping”
JCE’s which occur over several years and areas as large as complete regions or countries; the
cases cited by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic all involve scenarios where the participants are
either present or in the immediate vicinity of the murders taking place.142
Danner and Martinez, it must be noted, do not advocate the wholesale abolition of the
JCE doctrine because it was invented from “whole cloth”. 143 Rather, they urge the limits of JCE
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liability ought to be merely defined more carefully and restricted to avoid dangers posed by its
unchecked use by prosecutors.
B. General Considerations In Favor of Legality of JCE
One criticism often leveled at the doctrine of JCE, as defined by the Appeals Chamber in
Tadic, is that it was not included or provided for in Article 7(1) of the Statute of the ICTY. Since
the Statute “confined itself to speaking of a few well specified categories (committing, planning,
ordering, instigating, aiding and abetting)…[t]o add another mode of criminal liability not
explicitly provided for in the Statute” constitutes an “unwarranted instance of judicial
creativity.”144 Powles offers that “conspiracy” and “complicity”, the two forms of commission
most closely resembling JCE, in fact do appear in Article 4(3) of the Statute, relating to the
commission of genocide. 145 Further, he argues, outside of the perceived severity of the charge of
genocide, there is no reason why it should be possible to “commit” genocide and incur liability
in a manner excluded from other crimes. 146
Cassese argues that the ICTY Statute provides that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction
over crimes that were found in customary international law, “as was emphasized inter alia by the
UN Secretary-General when he submitted the Statute to the Security Council for approval.”147
(emphasis in original) Moreover, offers Cassese, it is well established in customary international
law that when a Statute is silent on the matter, a Tribunal may decide for itself what general
concepts of criminal law it shall apply to modes of responsibility and defenses, amongst other
things.148 In light of this, the fact that the Tribunal chose to construe the term “commit” broadly
was consistent with customary international law, and was necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
144
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Statute “to prosecute all those responsible for serious crimes in the former Yugoslavia.”149 The
Appeals Chamber was not engaging in “judicial creativity” so much as it was carrying out its
mandated responsibilities to find, interpret, and apply the law to the case before it.150 The belief
that
Some have argued that the concept of JCE should be replaced by co-perpetration, an
older and better-known doctrine. Cassese allows that co-perpetration is a doctrine “embedded in
many civil law systems” and which has its own merits, but points out that the ICTY Appeals
Chamber dismissed the use of co-perpetration because it believed JCE better suited to the
international criminality before it.151 Indeed, the Appeals Chamber made their position quite
clear when they held that the doctrine of co-perpetration:
does not have support in customary international law or in the settled
jurisprudence of the Tribunal, which is binding on the Trial Chambers.
By way of contrast, joint criminal enterprise is a mode of liability which
is firmly established in customary international law… and is routinely
applied in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.152
In a similar vein, Cassese notes that criticisms have argued that in defining JCE, the Appeals
Chamber “relied upon common law concepts while concomitantly using terms typical of the civil
law tradition,” causing confusion and, one assumes, undercutting the overall credibility of the
doctrine.153 Mr. Cassese concedes this point, but holds the doctrine is nonetheless sound, and that
using language which may borrow from two competing legal perspectives does not render the
doctrine any less solid from the perspective of customary international law.154
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Critics have also pointed out that the doctrine of JCE requires an Defendant to participate
more significantly to a crime as an accomplice, under aiding and abetting, than under a JCE,
despite the argument that a participant in a JCE is supposedly more blameworthy than an
accomplice to a crime.155 This is because an aider and abettor must carry out:
substantial acts specifically directed to assist in the perpetration of the
(main) crime, while the co-perpetrator must only perform acts (of any kind)
that in some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose.156

Cassese offers the following in defense of the doctrine, implicitly acknowledging the veracity of
the criticism offered; a co-perpetrator of a JCE shares the same mens rea as all the other
members, and intends to commit the agreed upon crime whereas an aider and abettor only
intends to help the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.157 An accomplice thus does not
share mens rea with the perpetrator, and this is the reason why the accomplice is considered less
blameworthy than the co-perpetrator, despite the higher standard for a showing of accomplice
liability.158
Not surprisingly, Cassese devotes the most time and energy to answering criticisms
targeting the third category of JCE, the most contentious of the categories of JCE liability, and
specifically, the argument that the foreseeability standard employed therein is not precise or
reliable. The logical end of this argument is that JCE III applies what is, in effect, a strict liability
standard.159 Cassese admits that it is “not an easy task for a court to determine whether the
criminal conduct of a person participating in a JCE, which lies outside the common plan or
agreement” was foreseeable to the Defendant, so that they could be said to have willingly
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accepted such risk.160 The burden to prove such circumstances, however, rests on Prosecution.
Meeting this threshold necessarily involves a showing of at least a specific fact that shows,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant should have been aware of the likelihood that a
crime, outside the scope of the original agreement, might occur.161 To illustrate, Cassese offers a
hypothetical wherein a common plan exists to remove a certain ethnicity from a multiethnic
village without recourse to murder or other violent measures.162 In this instance, Cassese argues,
the Prosecution would need to show that the participants in the JCE had a past history of murder
and rape, and that the Defendant knew this.163 The Prosecution would also need to show that the
Defendant willingly took the risk that this additional crime would occur.164 The fact that the
Defendant willingly accepted this risk may be inferred from a number of factual
circumstances.165
Cassese argues that the real issues here relate to culpability and causation, not
evidence.166 Critics have held that JCE III liability ignores the fact that an Defendant can only be
found to be guilty if there is a causal link between his mens rea and the crime, establishing their
culpability.167 In the case of JCE III, Cassese argues, many see the fact that an Defendant may be
found just as guilty, even though they lack the specific intent of the actual perpetrator, for the
commission of the secondary crime as a fundamental problem with JCE III liability.168
Ultimately, many critics fear, the person who intended the death would be considered as culpable
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as the person who did not intent the death.169 Cassese advances three arguments to respond to
these concerns.
1. The Doctrine of JCE III Serves Important Public Policy Considerations
First, the doctrine of JCE III serves important public policy considerations. Society
should be protected against individuals who band together to carry out criminal plans, especially
where members of that criminal enterprise foresaw the possibility that additional crimes would
occur, and did not oppose those crimes or try to prevent their occurrence.170 Cassese includes, in
the footnotes of his article, opinions from the House of Lords, and which merit further discussion
here.171 Though the decisions refer to accessorial liability which properly is equated with aiding
and abetting crimes in international criminal law, the policies described are germane to the
operation of JCE III on the international level, and thus, the force of their logic should in no way
be diminished, despite this variance. First, Lord Steyn notes that if the law required proof of the
specific intent of the non-perpetrating party, accessorial liability would be seriously
undermined.172 The party who foresees a murder, which might arise from a criminal plan, and
nonetheless assists and encourages the primary offender in the criminal enterprise, should be
guilty of murder.173 From this it seems that the party who assists in the commission of a crime,
foreseeing the possibility that a murder might occur, is even more blameworthy. Not only did
that person foresee the possibility that a murder might occur, but that person nonetheless actually
participated in a criminal act, which is in and of itself worthy of blame, with the possibility that
this additional crime. Thus though the discussion originates under the purview of accessorial
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liability in Britain, it clearly has parallels to the concerns underpinning JCE III liability. From the
perspective of blameworthiness, Lord Steyn argues, the non-perpetrator is culpable because they
had the opportunity to act and did not, and this situation is one that society has an interest in
punishing, in the hopes of creating an deterrent mechanism for similar situations which may arise
in the future.174 Again, under JCE III liability, not only did the individual have a chance to act,
they actually participated in the criminal act that led to the unanticipated additional criminal act.
Society has an interest in deterring the original criminal act, in which the individual participated,
and which led to the subsequent criminal act.
This deterrence principle is echoed in the speech of Lord Hutton which advocates
“practical considerations of weight and importance related to considerations of public policy …
prevail over considerations of strict logic” when common sense and protecting the public is at
stake.175 In fact, practicality is of fundamental importance in providing a supporting rationale for
JCE III. Lord Steyn provides that “[e]xperience has shown that joint criminal enterprises only
too readily escalate into the commission of greater offences.”176 It is precisely this escalation that
JCE III seeks to prevent and deter, by providing punishments for non-perpetrators which is equal
to that of the individual that actually physically commits the additional crime.
2. Incidental Criminal Liability based upon Foresight and Risk are Commonly
Accepted Bases for Culpability when a Nexus Exists between the Initial Crime and
the Incidental Crime

Secondly, the fact that the second crime is an outgrowth of the first should not be
neglected in an analysis of the validity of JCE III criminality.177 It is significant that “but-for”
causation exists between the two crimes. The second crime could only have occurred because the
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JCE planned to execute the initial crime in the first place.178 This is to be distinguished from
situations wherein a crime is committed as an outgrowth of a plan that is, in the first place,
legal.179 Under those circumstances, for example when a military unit carries out a legitimate
military action, when a member of the common plan commits an subsequent and unanticipated
illegal act, the culpability for that act is considered theirs alone.180 Under JCE III liability, all
participants are already blameworthy because they possess the mens rea of intent to commit the
initial crime. Where liability arises for the non-perpetrators is in the nexus of the causal link
between the two crimes.181 This principal is supported by the rulings of various courts, including
the Italian Court of Cassation in D’Ottavio and others, where liability for a participant in a
criminal enterprise was able to foresee the possibility of incidental crimes being committed and
took that risk by participating in the initial criminal enterprise.182 Because the Defendant could
have prevented the crime or disassociated himself from it, but did not, the Defendant was found
to share in the guilt for the incidental crime.183
Cassese acknowledges that, in a “mature” legal system, it might be possible to accord a
slightly reduced culpability to the non-perpetrating participant in the JCE.184 For example,
Cassese offers, the perpetrator could be charged with murder while the non-perpetrating
participant might be charged with manslaughter. 185This could effectively account for the lesser
culpability of the non-perpetrator while still holding them to task for their role in the commission
of the incidental crime.186 International criminal law is not, Cassese believes, developed enough
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to provide even this level of nuanced distinction between crimes. 187 Indeed, Cassese believes,
trying to pursue this would likely result in the charging of the non-perpetrator with other
categories of crimes altogether. This would not be well suited to the circumstances in which the
crime arose, and in which guilt could be found and apportioned.188
Additionally, an important qualification is offered for this discussion of incidental
liability, namely, that such a discussion is moot when the incidental crime is one, such as
genocide, persecution or aggression, which requires a special or specific intent on the part of the
perpetrator.189 By definition, one can not be found liable under JCE III for these crimes. To be
found guilty of these special intent crimes, one must be proven to possess the appropriate mens
rea towards the special intent crime, and if a non-perpetrator was found to share that mens rea
(again, a requisite for a finding of guilt for special intent crimes) they would fall under the first
or second categories of JCE liability, not the third.190 Otherwise, the non-perpetrator would be
liable for aiding and abetting, but not for JCE which establishes individual, not accessorial
liability. 191Again, it would be logically impossible for a non-perpetrator to be found guilty under
a theory of JCE III for specific intent crimes, and thus, these crimes must be excluded from a
discussion considering culpability arising from incidental criminal liability. Thus only certain
crimes can even be committed by an Defendant under JCE III liability.
E. Any Perceived Discrepency between the Guilt of the Perpetrating and NonPerpetrating Defendant can be Mitigated at the Sentencing Stage

In order to accommodate concerns arising from the culpability principle, the lesser form
of mens rea of the non-perpetrating participant, will be weighed by the court at the sentencing
187

Id.
Id.
189
Id. at 121.
190
Id. 121.
191
Id.
188

43

stage, and a lesser punishment will be meted out to the non-perpetrator if the interests of justice
so require.192 This is crucial when considering that fact that the foreseeability standard is an
objective one, asking not what the Defendant subjectively had foreseen, but what a reasonable
person in their position would have foreseen.193 Although Cassese believes this lower burden on
the Prosecution is an appropriate one for the following three reasons:
the crimes at issue are massive and of extreme gravity; moreover, they are normally
perpetrated under exceptional circumstances of armed violence…[u]nder these circumstances one can legitimately expect… persons participating… be particularly alert to
the possible consequences of their actions… [s]econd, the gravity of the crimes at issue
makes it necessary for the world community to prevent and punish … to the maximum
extent … of legality… [t]hirdly, in international criminal law there is no fixed scale of
penalties; courts are therefore free duly to appraise the level of culpability of the accused
and accordingly impose a congruous sentence194
Cassese seems to imply that this lower threshold might be subject to valid criticisms if courts did
not possess the discretion to sentence in accordance with the perceived guilt of the convicted
parties.195 Thus if international criminal law carried mandatory sentencing requirements, one
might reasonably expect a more spirited debate about whether an objective or subjective
foreseeability standard should be applied to cases of JCE III.
C. The Statute of the ECCC clearly intends to provide JCE liability as a mode of
committing a crime
1. The Language Used by the Drafters of the Statute of the ECCC is
Significantly Similar to that used by other Tribunals, and Shows the Intent of
the Drafters that the ECCC have the same Broad Powers as those other
Tribunals.
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The language of the Statute of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC) clearly evince an intention to exercise jurisdiction over all persons responsible for
“crimes and serious violations” committed during the reign of the Khmer Rouge.196 First of all,
even the most cursory look at Article 29 of the ECCC Statute, which discusses individual
responsibility for the commission of crimes covered in Articles 3 through 8, leads one to the
assumption that the ECCC means to employ the same methodology, including modes of
individual responsibility, as the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL. The language in the ECCC Statute
discussing individual criminal responsibility is, for all intents and purposes, identical to the
sections discussing individual criminal liability in the statutes of the aforementioned tribunals. In
each tribunal, an Defendant who is found guilty of having planned, instigated, ordered, aided and
abetted, or committed, crimes listed in specific sections of the statute of the tribunal, shall be
held individually responsible for those crimes.197 The fact that identical language has been
employed is obviously not coincidental, and indicates in no subtle way the intent for each
tribunal to have as much power and flexibility as the ICTY. And among the various inferences
that must be drawn from such borrowed language is that the ECCC is intended to have the power
to utilize JCE as a mode of individual criminal responsibility.
This fact is further suggested the myriad other instances where the language of the ICTY
Statute has been borrowed by the ECCC Statute, further supporting the notion that the ECCC
was intended, and is expected, to be able to apply the law, be it from Cambodia or international
196
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custom, in a manner consistent with the other international and hybrid tribunals in operation
today.198 This is also supremely rational since the previously mentioned tribunals were
established in order to investigate genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, precisely
the same topics the ECCC was created to investigate and adjudicate.
The fact that the crimes being investigated by the other tribunals largely occurred in the
context of a larger armed struggle is of no moment because the substance of the crimes, as well
as the desire to bring to light and punish the grave breaches of human rights provide more
commonality amongst the tribunals than difference. The simple fact is that all these tribunals
were created in order to provide justice for victims, and to ensure that such heinous crimes are
not conducted with impunity. The fact that the ECCC is not expressly investigating and
prosecuting “violations of the laws or customs of war” does not fundamentally differentiate it
from the other tribunals.199
One might be tempted to stop an analysis regarding whether or not the ECCC should
allow for individual criminal liability to arise pursuant to a JCE at this point. However, courts
and jurists are not lemmings of course, and the rationale that the other International and Hybrid
tribunals are applying a particular doctrine does not mean that the ECCC is necessarily bound to
follow along. Though such precedent urges strongly in favor of finding that JCE should be an
accepted manner of committing a crime, many other factors argue in favor of accepting the
doctrine JCE in the ECCC.
2. The Personal Jurisdiction of the ECCC is Broad and Suggests the Desire to
Punish All Those Responsible for Human Rights Abuses within the Specified
Temporal Jurisdictional Limits.
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The first article of the Statute of the Extraordinary Chambers states that the intention of
the tribunal is to “bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were
most responsible” for the commission of crimes and violations of Cambodian law, customary
international law, and any international conventions to which Cambodia was a party at the
time.200 This language provides a wide net of liability indeed. First of all, the fact that the drafters
of the Statute of the ECCC used language which specifically identified breaches of “customary
international law,” in a time when customary international law has basically accepted the
doctrine of JCE as a means of committing human rights violations, provides a very powerful
inference that they had the doctrine of JCE liability in the forefront of their minds when drafting
the statue. The fact that JCE liability was found to be a part of customary international law, and
thus an appropriate modality of liability for criminal acts, was certainly not unknown to the
drafters. And the fact that the various other tribunals were applying JCE liability on this legal
justification, provided by the ICTY in the Tadic Appeal, could not have escaped the drafters of
the Statute of the ECCC, particularly in light of the fact that they adopted the language of the
ICTY. It seems clear that the drafters intended JCE to be a valid method of commission of a
crime. Other language supports this assertion.
Though the ECCC Statute defines the persons differently than the ICTY, the result of this
differs more in form than substance. The Statute of the ICTY declares that it shall have
jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the statute.201 However, those legal persons shall
include only those persons “responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
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… in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.”202 Ultimately, this second criteria,
requiring serious violations of international humanitarian law, provides a restriction, albeit a very
minimal one at that. It still allows for the prosecution of any person responsible for violations of
international humanitarian law. By contrast, the Statute of the ECCC claims personal jurisdiction
over:
senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most
responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian laws
related to crimes, international humanitarian law and custom, and
international conventions recognized by Cambodia.203
While the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC does not extent to “all natural persons” like the
ICTY, the ECCC nonetheless shall exercise personal jurisdiction over “those most responsible”
for the specified violations, which include violations of domestic law. Recall that the Statute of
the ICTY limits its personal jurisdiction to those persons “responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law” and one sees that a compelling argument could be made that the
Statute of the ECCC actually provides a more expansive personal jurisdiction than that of the
ICTY; both are limited to serious violations, but the ECCC can prosecute violations of
international and domestic law whereas the ICTY is limited to breaches of international law
only. Moreover, the Statute of the ECCC also specifically mentions breaches of customary
international law. The Statute of the ICTY is silent on breaches of customary international law,
though it is obvious such breaches should be, and are, within the power of the ICTY to
prosecute. By providing the ECCC powers of personal jurisdiction that are at least as broad as, if
not in fact more so than, those of the ICTY, the drafters of the ECCC evidenced their intent that
the ECCC would have the same powers as the ICTY and the other international human rights
tribunals.
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3. The Substance of the Articles of the ECCC Strongly Suggest the Application of
JCE Liability in its Proceedings.

The fact that Article 2 of the ECCC Statute mentions “senior leaders of Democratic
Kampuchea” suggests that JCE liability is essential to the tribunal in order for it to be able to
achieve its desired ends.204 One fundamental purpose of JCE is to punish those individuals who
deserve blame for their role in the commission of unspeakable crimes, yet did not personally
carry out the physical perpetration of those crimes. Such individuals are often an integral part of
a system designed to commit crimes, and JCE liability is the mode by which they are held
criminally responsible as individuals and perpetrators for the commission of those crimes. This is
also suggested by the deliberate use of the phrase “all suspects” (emphasis added) as those who
may be found criminally responsible for violations of the laws identified in Articles 3 through 8
in the Statute of the ECCC.205 All persons responsible for violations of those articles obviously
includes senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea. Without JCE liability for those individuals, as
well as for any other persons who may have been involved in common criminal purpose with
those leaders but who did not physically perpetrate the crimes at issue, a crucial purpose of the
ECCC would be undermined.
The intent of the drafters to cast a wide net of liability is also evident in the language used
in Article 29, defining the modes by which individual criminal responsibility may be established.
The language is, like most of the language of the Statute of the ECCC, borrowed from the
Statutes of the ICTY and other tribunals, and it attempts to include every way that a crime might
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be committed, including the phrases: “planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or
committed.”206
There is, however, one place where the Statute of the ECCC departs from the Statute of
the ICTY in significant manner; Article 40. This provision prevents the Royal Government of
Cambodia from requesting “an amnesty or pardon for any persons who may be investigated for
or convicted of crimes referred to in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law.”207 The prohibition on
requests for amnesty or pardon can only be read in one way; the Statute of the ECCC intends to
wield the power to investigate all serious crimes committed by all persons in Cambodia during
the relevant temporal limits. By way of comparison, the Statute of the ICTY allows that:
[i]f, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the
convicted person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for
pardon or commutation of sentence, the State concerned
shall notify the International Tribunal accordingly. The
President of the International Tribunal, in consultation
with the judges, shall decide the matter on the basis of
the interests of justice and the general principles of law.208

Though the above quote only applies after conviction, is meant to prevent the
imprisoning state from commuting a sentence, and is obviously a far cry from a guarantee that an
Defendant being prosecuted by the ICTY will receive a commutation, that possibility remains.
This further suggests that the intent of the drafters of the Statute of the ECCC clearly intended to
give the Court the power to prosecute all persons responsible for all enumerated crimes. The
Statute of the ECCC is clear in giving the Court a mandate to prosecute all responsible parties,
even to the point of employing stronger language than that used to create precursor tribunals on
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whose model the ECCC is based. In order to be able to effectively carry out that mandate, the
ECCC requires the power to find liability by way of the JCE doctrine.

V. Conclusion
The doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise liability has now effectively become a part of
the international criminal legal jurisprudence. Though it is currently in a state of flux, with a
metaphorical tug of war occurring between those who would seek to expand its use and those
who would seek to restrict it, the discussion has turned from one concerned with the general
validity of the Doctrine to the specific limits of liability under JCE. Recently, those limits have
focused on trying to ensure that punishment matches guilt, consistent with the culpability
principle, and on how and when intent can be inferred by the circumstances in which a
Defendant acts. These questions will continue play a crucial role in the future of international
criminal legal jurisprudence, especially considering the role that JCE has played in the
development of international criminal law over the past fifteen years. In the end, the idea that
group participants may be held responsible for the acting as a group is not new, and serves a vital
purpose in providing justice in situations where it otherwise might not be served. If for this
reason alone, one may expect the Doctrine of JCE liability to play a central role in the future of
international criminal law. But this is not the only reason. The JCE Doctrine strikes at the heart
of what is now taken for granted, and which has indeed become a part of customary international
law –that a person cannot be held criminally liable without personal guilt. This tenet will likely
continue to be in tension with another deeply cherished belief – that a guilty party should be
punished for their actions. The Doctrine of JCE will thus continue to exist somewhere between
the desire to ensure fair trials and personal responsibility for criminal actions, and to receive
justice or reconciliation in the wake of unspeakable tragedy, into the foreseeable future.
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